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n recent months, the formal Brexit transition
period has come to an end, completing Brit-
ain’s exit from the European Union. Deliver-
ing on the Leave Campaign’s promise to end
unrestricted immigration to the United Kingdom
from Europe has resulted in shutting British citi-
zens out of the EU’s free movement regime. The
cost of Brexit for each and every British citizen has
been the automatic loss of the EU citizenship that
came with Britain’s membership in the EU. While
this has indirect repercussions for all British citi-
zens, the consequences were more immediate for
the estimated 1.2 million Britons who had taken
up the opportunities offered by the project of
European integration and settled elsewhere in the
EU. Yet the British in Europe are a lesser known
story of these times.
Brexit is part of the long-standing politicization
of migration in Britain. Most recently, this took
shape as the “hostile environment” policies of suc-
cessive Conservative-led governments since 2010.
Over this period, officials sought public support
for an increasingly restrictive and exclusionary
immigration regime, reframing the question of
who should have the right to settle in the UK
around a distinction between deserving and unde-
serving migrants.
The Leave Campaign piggybacked on this nar-
rative, casting Europe as a threat to Britain’s sov-
ereignty over its own borders. Central within this
framing was the misrepresentation of free move-
ment—of EU citizens, alongside goods and services
originating in the EU—as a system of open borders
that anyone could cross. The pro-Brexit camp pro-
moted the idea that this system had left Britain and
its welfare state vulnerable to abuse by benefit-
scrounging Europeans. The only solution was to
shut the border and put an end to free movement.
This rhetoric lacked supporting evidence, but nev-
ertheless proved potent. On June 23, 2016, a nar-
row majority of British voters approved the
proposal for Britain to exit the EU, setting in
motion a withdrawal process that would last more
than four years.
A DIVERSE AND DISPERSED DIASPORA
The Brexit story’s neglect of 1.2 million British
citizens living in the EU is perhaps unsurprising
when placed in the broader context of Britain’s
self-image as an “island nation” whose recent
approach to migration lies in ensuring that it has
strong borders. Yet emigration has long played an
important role in Britain’s real migration story.
Following the long history of people leaving
Britain to take part in the formation of the British
Empire, the scale of contemporary emigration
flows has made Britain’s emigrant population one
of the largest in the world. Over the past forty
years, mobility within the EU has become an
important part of that story. In the first decade
of the twenty-first century, greater numbers of
British citizens left the UK for the EU than for des-
tinations in the former British dominions of Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and Canada. Free movement
was two-way traffic.
British citizens in the EU are one of the success
stories of Europeanization. They are often econom-
ically and socially integrated in their places of work
and residence. A broad-brush understanding of
what inspired their mobility within the EU includes
opportunities for work, study, and retirement, but
also love: dual-national relationships are a common
illustration of the intimate life changes wrought
through Europeanization.
Although popular representations of the British
on the continent all too often fixate on those who
have retired to the sunnier climes of southern Eur-
ope, the emigré population is as diverse as the
British population as a whole. At least 75 percent
of Britons living in the EU are of working age and
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below. They include people of color, as well as
children born and educated in the EU. For some,
mobility within Europe has been tied to social
mobility, particularly at times when opportunities
were more restricted in Britain. As a result of the
lower thresholds for settlement available to EU
citizens, British citizens occupy all the different
strata of European and local labor markets, from
seasonal work in the tourism and hospitality
sectors to managerial roles in European and
multinational companies.
UK citizens have settled in all 27 EU member
states, with substantial British populations found
in Spain, France, and Ireland. Once they are
socially integrated, they may or may not seek out
social relationships with other British citizens. In
fact, at the time of the Brexit referendum, their most
notable characteristic was how seldom they had
formed extensive networks with their compatriots
in Europe, beyond the support groups that had
developed on the ground within identifiable British
communities in Europe. Brexit would change that.
SHRINKING RIGHTS
As the referendum approached, British citizens
who had lived outside the UK for longer than fifteen
years discovered that they would not be able to
vote. Although Leave campaigners promised that
nothing would change for them or for the 3 million
EU citizens living in the UK, this turned out to be
little more than an empty promise. Once Article 50
of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty was triggered, signaling
Britain’s intention to leave the EU, the terms for the
exit negotiations made it clear that new legislation
and processes would be needed to protect the rights
of these mobile citizens in the post-Brexit era.
Although citizens’ rights were at the heart of phase
one of the talks, the negotiating guidelines issued
by the European Council made clear that “nothing
is agreed until everything is agreed.”
As the negotiations dragged on, deadlines were
extended time and again. The threat of the talks
collapsing and Britain leaving without a deal
repeatedly raised its head. Even after the With-
drawal Agreement was struck, and endorsed by
the European Council in late 2018, political tur-
bulence in the UK prevented passage of the pact by
Parliament. It was only at the eleventh hour, just
before the Brexit deadline, that it became law in
January 2020. This finally secured the limited ac-
commodations and protections the Withdrawal
Agreement offered to British citizens who had law-
fully exercised their right to free movement.
Now that they are no longer EU citizens with
conditional rights to free movement, their new
status is only a shadow of what they had enjoyed
previously. Although the agreement secures the
necessary legal basis of their residency in Europe,
with access to the labor market, health care, and
social security, it shrinks the geographical scope of
their rights and entitlements to their country of
residence. As such, they are no longer eligible for
continued freedom of movement within the EU
and lose their franchise in European Parliament
elections. But they will still have more expansive
rights than British citizens moving to the EU after
Brexit.
In light of this narrowing geographical scope of
rights, implementation of the Withdrawal Agree-
ment was left to individual member states. First
held up by the prolongation of the Brexit negotia-
tions, the process was further delayed by the
COVID-19 pandemic.
These are the headlines of what Brexit means, at
a political and legal level, for British citizens
already living within the EU. But it doesn’t end
there.
CAUGHT IN THE CROSSHAIRS
Since the Brexit referendum, the lives of these
Britons in Europe have been caught in the cross-
hairs of the tense negotiations between the UK and
the EU, as well as the British government’s inter-
nal political wrangling over how hard a line to
take on Brexit. Even in late 2020, with the end
of the Brexit transition period fast approaching,
many EU member states still had not released the
final details of the domestic legislation, processes,
and systems they would need to adopt so that
British citizens lawfully residing within their bor-
ders could secure their rights under the terms of
the Withdrawal Agreement.
And with no answers, there was nowhere to
turn. Information provided by the UK government
or EU member states was limited and slow to
trickle down, giving British citizens in Europe the
impression that they were out of sight and out of
mind. Many have experienced a sense of profound
uncertainty and helplessness.
Nonetheless, Britons started to take matters into
their own hands the morning after the referendum.
For some, this meant political organizing, as new
grassroots organizations advocating for the rights
of British citizens living in the EU quickly gained
momentum. Others started to explore what was
within their power as individuals to limit the
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already tangible effects of Brexit on their lives.
Aware that Britain’s withdrawal was already desta-
bilizing the foundations of their mobility and set-
tlement within the EU, they sought to establish
new roots.
For many of these Britons living in the EU, es-
tablishing new roots meant formalizing their resi-
dence status. In countries with no compulsory
requirement for EU citizens to register their resi-
dency (such as France), this resulted in an unprec-
edented surge in applications and an associated
administrative burden for municipal officers
tasked with processing them. Some British citizens
reported that they had been sent away empty-
handed on various grounds—that as EU citizens
they did not need these permits, that they were
not eligible because of Brexit, or that the permits
would not be valid after Brexit. It was clear that
local municipal officers were flummoxed about
the status of British citizens following the Brexit
referendum.
For others who had deferred making a firm
commitment to residence in a particular member
state as long as they had the
ability to move with ease
across the EU, Brexit forced
a reassessment. It became
clear that lawful residence
would be the measure of
whether they were covered
by the terms of the With-
drawal Agreement. They made decisions about
their future residence plans that they had been
putting off.
EU member states permitting dual nationality
saw large increases in the numbers of resident Brit-
ish citizens applying for citizenship. Another route
was for Britons to claim citizenships to which they
were entitled through ancestry (as in Ireland) as
a way of maintaining their rights as EU citizens. But
the pursuit of citizenship was considerably more
restrained in countries with an official requirement
for new citizens to renounce any other nationality
upon naturalization (as in Spain).
Not everyone had access to such preemptive
strategies. Contrary to the Leave Campaign’s
mischaracterization of Europeans moving to the
UK to take advantage of the welfare state, free-
dom of movement was always a conditional
right. In some cases, British citizens spurred to
register their residence abroad found themselves
judged against conditional requirements,
compelled to demonstrate that they were not
a burden to the nation-state and had the Com-
prehensive Sickness Insurance required by EU
law.
In a handful of cases in France, it was determined
that British citizens were not lawful residents,
sometimes after they had lived there for many years.
They simply lacked sufficient resources to sustain
themselves, due to factors such as chronic ill health
restricting the ability to continue working, or
a recent bereavement resulting in a serious loss of
income.
A ruling that someone is not lawfully resident
can cut off their access to health care and other
social entitlements; if these decisions are not over-
turned, it might also mean that they are not eligi-
ble for the protections provided by the Withdrawal
Agreement. The administrative burden and asso-
ciated costs of applying for citizenship could place
secure status further out of reach for some of these
Britons. After many years of working with British
citizens living in France, it would not surprise me
to see those who are most vulnerable, living in
relative poverty but able to
survive hand to mouth in
part because of a low cost of
living, choose to continue to
live undocumented lives.
The impact of Brexit has
already been unevenly felt
among British citizens living
in the EU. Their different social positions along
intersecting axes—including class, gender, race,
age, and disability—left them vulnerable to Brexit
in a variety of ways and positioned them to
respond differently to its effects on their lives. As
the Withdrawal Agreement is implemented and
they come to rely on its protections, it is likely
that these inequalities will become even more
visible.
The focus of the Leave Campaign on the politics
of immigration downplayed and overlooked the
presence of British citizens living in the EU.
Although they are only one part of a bigger picture,
they have had to find ways of living with the direct
consequences of Britain’s vote to leave the EU. As
the transition period ends, their new status will
come into force. In the months, years, and decades
to come, the Withdrawal Agreement and the pro-
tections it offers these former EU citizens will be put
to the test. Only time will tell if it is up to the
task. &
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The impact of Brexit has already
been unevenly felt among British
citizens living in the EU.
